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AVIATION AND MAXIM CUJUS EST SOLUM
AVIATION AND THE MAXIM CUJUS EST SOLUM*
BY GEORGE B. LOGAN
In these days of competition between lawyers and trust com-
panies, between lawyers and real estate men, between lawyers
and insurance companies, and in these times when group in-
surance, sick benefits and workmen's compensation laws are
settling for themselves many questions formerly litigated, it is
comforting to know that there is a new industry, which offers
hope of some additional employment not only to lawyers of today
but to the lawyers of the next several generations.
Perhaps this is only by way of saying that the law is a per-
manent profession. Each new invention, each new development
of civilization, each new mode of living brings its law and its
litigation. The casebooks are full of reports of railroad suits,
automobile cases, electric power and telephone cases, all arising
by virtue of new inventions and representing litigation non-
existent but for these new inventions.
We now have on our legal as well as on our social horizon a
new invention as important as any of the others because it in-
volves a change of transportation as well as of our mode of liv-
ing, and because it offers a possibility of more litigation and leg-
islation than probably any other. The reason I make this state-
ment is that this new invention, the airplane, makes use of a
hitherto unused element. The air is now usable for transporta-
tion-it is navigable. The significance of this statement, in
view of the facts that only land and water have heretofore been
usable for this purpose in all the thousands of years of our his-
tory, can hardly be overestimated.
What the effect will be on law as well as on life can at best be
but conjectured in a brief talk, such as I mean this to be. In
fact, only one topic of the limitless possibilities may be men-
tioned.
The first violent impact of this new invention on the old order
of things in law is the clash when the right to air navigation runs
* Credit for the major portion of this material is gladly given to the brief
of Messrs. Cuthell, Hotchkiss & Mills, attorneys in the Swetland-Curtis
case cited above. G. B. L.
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directly afoul of one of the most firmly and permanently estab-
lished rules of our common law.
All law students are familiar with the maxim, Cujus est solum,
ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos. For more than ten
years lawyers have speculated in addresses such as this one and
in articles in pamphlets and legal magazines, as to what would
happen when some landowner should say "No" to an aviator
flying over his land and should invoke the maxim as the reason
for his "No," and ask the aid of the courts to make his "No" ef-
fective. It is still permissible to speculate, although the point
has been raised in two cases in the United States; for, unfor-
tunately, it has not been definitely determined. The cases to
which I refer are Smith v. New England Aircraft Company,1
and Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation.2
The facts in these cases were fairly similar. In each case a
landowner, whose property adjoined an airport, had brought
suit to enjoin the flying of the planes using the airport over his
property and, in each case, had alleged that these flights con-
stituted both trespass and nuisance. In both of these cases the
courts held that flights above 500 feet were lawful, basing their
decision as to this point on the regulations issued by the Depart-
ment of Commerce,3 which define the minimum safe altitudes of
flight at 500 feet and above. The Air Commerce Act itself
specifies that the navigable air space (above the minimum safe
altitudes of flight) shall be subject to a public right of flight. In
both cases, however, the courts held that flights below 500 feet
constituted trespasses. Both courts discussed at length the
ancient nmaxim and threw considerable doubt on the birth, origin,
and respectability of the old greybeard, but both were apparently
loath to let loose of so well established a legal doctrine.
Bear in mind that we lawyers likewise have a well established
doctrine in our own minds and that is that trespass implies and
calls to mind either title or possession. Hence, to sustain the
action of trespass, the plaintiffs in these cases must have had
either ownership of the air space or possession of it. Not having
-possession, at least not physical possession, the theory of tres-
(Mass. 1930) 170 N. E. 385.
(D. C. N. D. Ohio, 1930) 41 F. (2d) 929.
'Air Commerce Act, 44 Stat. 568 (1926), 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 171.
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pass in the minds of the court must have been based upon owner-
ship. Since the shadow of these decisions has hung as a pall
over the future of air navigation, it is exceedingly important
that we as lawyers investigate for ourselves the birthplace and
the family history of this maxim of law.
Dean Pound has said that sometimes a Latin maxim is a sub-
stitute for thought and it remains for us to see whether this
maxim appears as thought or merely a substitute.
The earliest English text in which we find a statement of the
maxim is COKE on LITTLETON. 4
And lastly, the earth hath in law a great extent upwards,
not only of water as hath been said, but of aire, and all other
things even up to heaven, for cujus est solum ejus est usque
ad coelum, as it is holden.
It is necessary to note that Lord Coke was considering the
feudal concept of land and that land then was of the highest
importance and the corner stone of the feudal system itself. So
respected was land that in an action trespass quare clausum fre-
git, if entry on one's land was shown, there was no defense.
But, under this system, there were rights in land or rather
arising out of the ownership of land, which did not attain to the
dignity of ownership or possession. There were such rights
as piscary and turbary; there were rights in common fields;
there were the necessary rights of ingress and egress; the an-
cient rights of firebote and fencebote; above all there was the
right of escheat which belonged to the crown. All of such rights
went with and appertained to the ownership of some parcel of
land (or with tenancy) but eventually were not expressed by the
land ownership itself.
Now it is evident that there are more ways of interfering with
rights in land than by actual trespass. One of the greatest
rights in land, a right which existed then and does now, is the
right of complete and peaceful enjoyment. This right could be
just as effectively interfered with by a boiler factory on one side
of the hedge as on the other. The early common law made a
distinction; for in the one case there was the action of trespass
and in the other the ancient writ of Quod permittat, the fore-
'Bk. 1, see. 1, "Terra," p. 4.
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runner of the action of nuisance. This gives us, then, the back-
ground at the time Coke wrote and gives us the sharp distinction
which existed at that time between the right of property and the
right of peaceful enjoyment of property. It is evident that what
Coke was saying was not only that a man's castle was his own
but also that he could build his castle as high as he saw fit and
that none might interfere. It is also evident, for that construc-
tion would have been as unnecessary as it was impossible, that
he was not saying that the man who owned the land owned the
cubic contents of the air space enclosed by vertical planes, pro-
jected upward from his boundary lines. This early distinction
between the action of trespass and the action of nuisance has ap-
parently been lost sight of, but it is important today in interpret-
ing the meaning of an old common-law writer.
With this survey of the background, let us return to Coke's
statement. He cited three cases from the Yearbooks. These
were 22 Henry VI 59, 10 Edward IV 14, 14 Henry VIII 12. The
first case is a dispute as to the ownership of six young goshawks
as between landlord and tenant under a lease. The second case
relates to the theft of muniments of title in which the case of the
goshawks is referred to. The latest one discusses the right of
the Bishop of London as landlord to certain herrons and shovel-
ers nesting in trees on land which the Bishop has leased. The
significance of some of the cases is somewhat obscure to the
reader of today but the result seems entirely sound. The crux
of the matter seems to be that the owner of land has an interest
in birds that nest in trees growing thereon because if he owns
the land which enfolds the roots of the trees he owns the branch-
es that are in the air space above and in which the birds in dis-
pute have their nests. The litigation between landlord and ten-
ant turns on the rights under leases and does not affect the ques-
tion in which we are particularly interested. All of these cases
emphasize the right of the landowner to the fullest use and en-
joyment of his property.
There remains the Latin maxim itself. Examination shows
that the words are attributable to Accursius, a glossator or com-
mentator on the Code, who flourished in Bologna about the year
1200. Mr. Bouve, in a very interesting discussion on this same
subject, finds evidence that the son of Accursius was taken to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss4/3
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England by Edward I on his return from the Holy Land and
there lectured on subjects of Roman Law at the University of
Oxford. It is suggested that this was the reason that the maxim
gained currency, as stated in Burry v. Pope,5 as early as Edward
I, who reigned from 1239 to 1307.
Accursius, however, used the phrase in a discussion of a right
to maintain a burial plot or tomb free from interference of an
overhanging building. There can be no quarrel with this doc-
trine, for an overhanging building would clearly have been a
permanent invasion of the right of complete enjoyment of the
land. But, when all is said and done, the rights now asserted in
air space inevitably come back to this Latin maxim.
After Coke's text, there came a discussion contemporary with
Coke in Penruddock's Case, reported by Coke himself. This in-
volved an overhanging building, dropping rain on the land, but
the action was by way of the writ of Quod permittat. The
holding was that it constituted a nuisance and that it should be
abated.
Another case, also contemporary with Coke, was Baten's Case.7
Here again was a projecting house, depositing rainfall on the
plaintiff's land, and again the use of the ancient writ of Quod
permittat.
There is a lapse then of over 200 years until we find the famous
dicta of Lord Ellenborough in Pickering v. Rudd., This was a
case of a projecting barber sign. Lord Ellenborough gave a
hint of the future when he said:
I do not think it is a trespass to interfere with the column
of air superincumbent on the close. . . . If this board over-
hanging the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow
that an aeronaut is liable to an action of trespass quare
clausum fregit at the suit of the occupier of every field over
which his balloon passes in the course of his voyage.
In view of the fact that balloon flights carrying passengers
had been inaugurated by the Montgolfier brothers in 1783, Lord
Ellenborough must be recognized as having at least the prophetic
sense of what is happening today.
(1588) 1 Cro. Eliz. 118. 7 (1611) 9 Coke 54.
'(1597) 3 Coke 205. 8 (1815) 4 Camp. 219.
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Following that came the case of Fay v. Prentice," which was a
case involving a projecting cornice, precipitating rainfall on
plaintiff's garden. The judge cited Penruddock's Case and
Baten's Case and referred to the Latin maxim as "a presumption
of law not applicable in all cases."
Just twenty years later, in Kenyon v. Hart,1° Lord Blackburn
quoted the dicta of Lord Ellenborough and said that he "agreed
with the sound sense of his comment, but doubted the legal
reasoning." With all due respect to the memory of Lord
Blackburn, it would seem that sound sense and legal reasoning
should not be strangers, but handmaidens and go together. In-
deed, Justice Holmes has said that the law is but the expression
of accumulated wisdom.
It will be noted that in the foregoing cases there was simply
a citation of the maxim, wholly unnecessary to the decisions
made. In the case of Corbett v. Hill,1 we again have dicta, by
Vice-Chancellor James, expressing a belief in the old maxim.
This was a case where the defendant, owning two adjoining
houses, had sold one to the plaintiff. The remaining house
owned by the defendant had a room which projected over the
line of the property sold to the plaintiff. It was unnecessary
for the Vice-Chancellor to make the statement that a conveyance
of the house conveyed the air space. The projecting room of the
defendant was an obstruction to the right of complete enjoy-
ment and could be abated as a nuisance.
A case decided in the same year which has been much
quoted and cited and for the most part incorrectly is the case of
Ellis v. Loftus.12 This is a case in which damages were sought
for injuries by one horse kicking another horse through the
fence. It is cited as authority for the proposition that a horse
kicking through a fence commits trespass, but the case itself is
based upon negligence.
These are the leading English cases down to date. Our
American cases have followed them almost blindly, and, as we
did not continue to retain in our practice the distinction between
the ancient action of Quod permittat (later succeeded by trespass
on the case) and the action of trespass, a great many of our cases
- (1845) 1 C. B. 827. n (1874) 9 L. R. Eq. 671.10 (1865) 32 L. J. Rep. 87. - (1874) L. R. 10, C. P. 10.
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indiscriminately use the word trespass in referring to overhang-
ing boughs, cornices, roofs, etc., while the cases themselves are
decided on the grounds of nuisance.
It is now necessary to stop and detour. In spite of the cases
holding that "he who owns the soil owns likewise to the heav-
ens," it is nevertheless true that from the most ancient of days,
everything which could fly has been permitted to fly. There
are no cases involving a trespass by bees, carrier pigeons, domes-
tic ducks, geese, chickens, and particularly by balloons. The non-
existence of the holding that flight by balloons constitutes a tres-
pass is a strong argument that the question of trespass was
never raised, because a balloon passage is noiseless and, while
noise may create a nuisance, it could not add to nor detract from
the existence of trespass.
It is now proposed to make a double-barrelled argument--first,
that the landowner does not own the air space, and second, that
if he does own the air space according to common law, the com-
mon law should be changed. In the first place, it is evident that
none of the decided cases involved anything beyond a height close
to the ground, and hence, even though the maxim was frequently
quoted, the statement of the maxim can at best be dicta in the
decided cases. It is well known that questions that merely lurk
in the record are not raised. It is only those questions necessary
to a decision of the case as presented that are in fact decided.
On the other half of the scales and weighing against the maxim
is the old and well-known statement by common-law writers
that there are certain properties which no man may own, among
them the air and the high seas. It is only fair to say that these
early writers, no more than Coke himself, had in mind air space.
They were probably referring to the element of air. But air
space, now that it has become navigable, at least is clearly
analogous to the navigable seas. Just as the navigable seas
belong to all nations and all men, so does the navigable air space
(aside from any question of national sovereignty, distinct from
ownership, which is not here discussed).
Finally, if the maxim has been the common law, it should be
changed because an individual owner of property should not be
permitted to assert rights unnecessary to his complete enjoy-
ment of his land and property, and at the same time destructive
of a right so necessary to the progress of civilization.
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In view of the fact that the greatest right arising out of land
ownership is the right to complete, undisturbed enjoyment, it is
sufficient if this right be preserved in its completest sense to the
landowner. The right of air navigation, therefore, should be
circumscribed and limited only by the right of the landowner to
the complete enjoyment of the land. This means that the right
of flight should be limited by the question of nuisance and hence
that flights which interfere by reason of noise, creating fear, in-
vasion of the right of privacy, etc., should be enjoined, not be-
cause they are trespasses, but because they are nuisances.
The new fact of flight, the new fact of air navigation should
be recognized, just as Chief Justice Taney in the opinion of the
Propellor Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,"" recognized the new fact
of river navigation brought about by the invention of steam-pro-
pelled boats.
England, by act of Parliament, has already brought at rest, in
the very cradle of the doctrine of the ancient maxim, any con-
tention of rights in the upper air space by the enactment of the
British Air Navigation Act of 1920,14 which provides as follows:
Sec. 9 (1). No action shall lie in respect of trespass or in
respect of nuisance, by reason only of the flight of aircraft
over any property, at a height above the ground, which hav-
ing regard to wind, weather and all the circumstances of the
case, is reasonable, or the ordinary incidents of such flight,
so long as the provisions of this Act and any order made
thereunder and of the convention are duly complied with.
It is to be hoped that either by statute or by enlightened judi-
cial opinion the same question will likewise be brought to a quiet
and permanent rest in this country.
1'10 & 11 Geo. V c. 80 see. 9 (1920).
- (1851) 53 U. S. 443.
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